As business finds itself, the cellar door in which we enter can sometimes get slammed shut - finding another way out is impractical so, what remains for business which intentionally hide really bad research from people, those that are human-beings, in most circles, (HR) Human Resources and the Legal departments will have a costly fight to bring about peace - peace that will cost a corporation millions and millions of dollars which may be needed elsewhere - like cash flow(s).
So read on - tell me; are these the actions of sane men and women - especially in Light of the reports from their own research? You tell me! The facts are here!
Are These Actions Good for Business?
Dear ALL,
Military Use of Depleted Uranium, its consequences (intended and unintended) is troubling for a number of reasons: Research and study prior to its use was comprehensive and danger signals were there but the DOD went ahead anyway.
The United States and NATO have worked diligently to avoid extensive investigation of sites contaminated in the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia by independent investigators.
The VA and the Military have given false and misleading information to congressional investigators.
True to type as evidenced in the Agent Orange boondoggle...the VA and the Military are stonewalling and delaying testing and treatment for Gulf War Syndrome...preferring to assign the disorders of the returning solders to “stress”.
According to our own local papers here in the Pacific Northwest the U.S. Navy is currently conducting tests in the fishing grounds off the pacific coast using depleted uranium clad munitions. When questioned by a reporter regarding the possible hazards for this to human and marine life...the navy spokesman say, “Gee I hope not. I haven’t started to glow yet.”
The URLs and the excerpt I have listed here are from credible sources and would give credence to the concerns of many throughout the world. Use of these kinds of sources would eliminate the knee jerk reaction of the hawks and or the extremists who would attack other kinds of sources as the “typical left wing liberal bubble headed thinking of, unpatriotic Peaceniks”...thus effective derailing dialogue and open debate. (A successful talk show strategy),
More as I find them.
http://www.iacenter.org/depleted/du.htm
http://www.who.int/environmental_information/radiation/depleted_uranium.htm
THIS IS REMOVED http://www.aepi.army.mil/Library/AEPI%20Publications/DU/
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THE FOLLOWING URL IS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND EASILY UNDERSTOOD.
The site supports its arguments with facts and with documents, some of which are internal memos and studies from such gov’t agencies as Los Alamos. Worth downloading and reading.
If perhaps you might think that the DOD wasn’t aware of the possible side effects and hazards to soldiers take a look at the U.S. Army study below...published 6 months PRIOR to the gulf war.
IV. BACK TO THE BEGINNING
We shall not ease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will to be arrive where we started and know the place for the first time. T.S. ELLIOT “Little Gidding” July 1990.
Just six months before the Gulf War, the U.S. Army released the Kinetic Energy Penetrator Long Term Strategy Study, a comprehensive report comparing the use of tungsten alloy and depleted uranium in armor-piercing ammunition. This report predicted that the large amounts of DU oxides created during combat could be inhaled by soldiers and civilians. Soldiers in ground combat units were identified as potentially receiving the highest exposures, and the expected health outcomes included cancers and kidney problems. The report further warned that public knowledge of the health and environmental effects of depleted uranium could lead to efforts to ban the use of DU in munitions. Looking back on the ten years since the release of this report, it is remarkable how many of the Army’s predictions have come true.
Appendix D of the 1990 Army report, titled Kinetic Energy Penetrator Environmental and Health Considerations, states:
“[A]erosol DU exposures to soldiers on the battlefield could be significant with potential radiological and toxicological effects. These health impacts may be impossible to reliably quantify even with additional detailed studies. It is not our intention to overstate this issue given other combat risks, nor to imply that the health of soldiers will definitely be compromised. We are simply highlighting the potential for levels of exposure to military personnel during combat that would be unacceptable during peacetime conditions. (AMCCOM, 1990: D(1), 4-5).
The Army assessed the dangers to its soldiers and determined that “under combat conditions, the MEI’s [most exposed individuals] are probably the ground troops that reenter a battlefield following the exchange of armor-piercing munitions, either on foot or on motorized transports.” (Ibid.: D(2), 3-4).
While the immediate risks of combat were noted to be of greater concern than the delayed effects of exposure to depleted uranium, the Army acknowledged that depleted uranium is a “low level alpha radiation emitter which is linked to cancer when exposures are internal, [and] chemical toxicity causing kidney damage.” (AMCCOM, 1990:
D(1), 2-2).” The Army’s prescience did little to affect the behavior of Gulf War commanders.
The Department of Defense now admits that field commanders did not train or warn servicemen and women about the hazards of depleted uranium on the battlefield.
(CBS, Don’t Look, Don’t Find 49 1999). Not one soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine with a known or suspected exposure to depleted uranium was medically tested following the war.
The 1990 report also noted that “assuming U.S. regulatory standards and health physics practices are followed, it is likely that some form of remedial action will be required in a DU post-combat environment. Remedial actions may consist of retrieval of penetrator fragments and decontamination of impact sites such as tanks, rocks, trees, buildings, etc.” (AMCCOM, 1990: D(1), 4-6).
The American equipment contaminated by depleted uranium was cleaned up; some contaminated vehicles were buried in Saudi Arabia and the remainder were shipped to South Carolina for decontamination and disposal. In Kuwait, contaminated equipment was either transported to the Boneyard or left in the Udairi Training Range. Apparently, the government of Iraq has not conducted any battlefield remediation of contaminated equipment. Similarly, clean up of depleted uranium in Kosovo and Serbia has apparently been hampered by NATO delays in the release of the locations and amounts of depleted uranium contamination.
In its darkest but most insightful vision, the report predicted that “following combat, the condition of the battlefield and the long-term health risks to natives and combat veterans may become issues in the acceptability of the continued use of DU kinetic energy penetrators for military applications.” (AMCCOM, 1990: D(2), 3-4).
Prior to the Gulf War, there was no effort to ban the use of depleted uranium munitions. Nine years later, many individuals, community groups, non-profit organizations and political parties in the United States, England, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Japan and other nations are working to end the use of depleted uranium in munitions and commercial products.
The more we learn about the use of depleted uranium in the Gulf War, the more accurate the 1990 predictions become. All our exploration has merely brought us back to where we started, but the story is not over. The Institute of Medicine is empowered to write the next chapter about the possible health effects on Gulf War veterans, but the controversy over the use of depleted uranium in munitions is likely to escalate in the years to come.
Additional research and investigation will help decision makers to formulate sound training, force protection, health care and clean up policies, but this may be too little, too late for Gulf War veterans, who have been left twisting in the wind by the Pentagon.
Don’t Look, Don’t Find
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Institute of Medicine should investigate the effects that exposures to combinations of chemical, biological, and radiological agents may have on Gulf War veterans’ current and future health. Specifically, the Institute of Medicine should examine veterans’ susceptibility to cancers, immune system damage, neurological effects, reproductive problems, respiratory disease, kidney damage and other health problems resulting from exposure to combinations of depleted uranium, oil well fire smoke, low levels of chemical warfare agents, experimental drugs and vaccines, pesticides and other toxins known to be present in the gulf. Keeping in mind the devastating effects that cancer can have on veterans and their families, the Institute of Medicine should evaluate the likelihood of future increases in cancers without waiting for veterans to develop cancers in statistically significant numbers.
2. The Department of Veterans Affairs should conduct an epidemiological study of Gulf War veterans and civilian contractors who had known or suspected exposures to depleted uranium. The Depleted Uranium Program at the Baltimore, MD VA Medical Center appears best suited to undertake such an endeavor. Areas of inquiry should include:
• The possibility that Gulf War veterans suffered clinical and/or sub-clinical kidney damage due to inhalation or ingestion of depleted uranium, and the significance of these injuries on the long-term health of veterans;
• The reproductive health of both female and male veterans and the implications of these findings on developmental effects in veterans’ children;
• The similarities or differences in health effects from exposure to embedded fragments and exposure via inhalation, ingestion, or wound contamination;
• The applicability of animal study findings on DU’s carcinogenicity, immunotoxicity, neurotoxicity, and reproductive effects to female and male veterans; and
• The development of latent health effects including cancer.
3. In accordance with historical precedent and resolving the many doubts about the scope and severity of depleted uranium exposures in favor of the veterans, the United States Congress should pass legislation granting a presumption of exposure to sufficient amounts of depleted uranium to cause adverse health problems for all veterans who served in or traveled to contaminated areas. The presumption of exposure should be extended to all veterans who:
• Served in or traveled to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Kuwait during the Gulf War conflict (August 2, 1990 to July 31, 1991);
• Served at the U.S. Army base at Doha, Kuwait during the July 11-12, 1991 munitions fire, and/or participated in clean up efforts; or
• Served in the Udairi Training Range in Kuwait from 1991 until a date when the
area is certified to be free of depleted uranium hazards.
Don’t Look, Don’t Find
4. Future depleted uranium research should investigate health effects resulting from all possible routes of exposure. Research to date has failed to examine health effects from inhalation, ingestion, and wound contamination. Reliable dose estimates should be developed for exposure through inhalation, ingestion, and wound contamination in a range of realistic exposure scenarios.
5. Future depleted uranium research should investigate the health effects of protracted internal exposure to varying levels of depleted uranium. The shortand long-term effects of low, medium, and high exposures to depleted uranium should be determined.
6. Congress should request a report from the Secretary of Defense on the status of depleted uranium training in the armed forces. Since the Army and Marine Corps do not know if troops deployed to Kosho have received any training or warnings about the hazards of DU, it is likely that troops deployed to Kuwait, South Korea, and other hot spots also have not been trained or properly equipped.
7. Following future conflicts in which veterans are exposed to depleted uranium and/or other chemical or biologic agents, Congress should appoint an independent organization to review evidence of exposures and to make recommendations for research and treatment. If we have learned anything from the last nine years of the Gulf War illness debate, it is that the Pentagon can not be trusted to objectively investigate toxic exposures or to accurately report about the efficacy of experimental drugs and vaccines.
8. An international organization, such as the World Health Organization, should investigate the potential connection between depleted uranium exposure and reports of increased rates of cancers and birth defects in Iraq. There is undoubtedly a large pool of Iraqi war veterans who inhaled depleted uranium oxides or were wounded by depleted uranium fragments that could be studied. In addition, Iraqi children with known or suspected exposures to depleted uranium (e.g., from playing on destroyed vehicles, collecting DU penetrators) should be studied to determine the possible role of depleted uranium in the etiology of increased diseases.
This research could shed further light on the relationship between depleted uranium exposure and American veterans’ illnesses.
9. The United States of America should accept responsibility for identifying, delimiting, and cleaning up all domestic and foreign lands where depleted uranium has been released. The Department of Defense should further issue immediate warnings to civilian populations, relief agencies, and the United
Nations when American armed forces use depleted uranium in training or combat operations on foreign soil.
10. The United States Congress should task the General Accounting Office to determine the life-cycle cost for depleted uranium. The expenses of creating depleted uranium through mining, enriching, and processing uranium should be added to the costs of manufacturing, testing, purchasing and using DU ammunition. The aggregate cost should also include the expenses of safety training and protective clothing for soldiers, medical monitoring of soldiers and civilians for exposure, health care for exposed veterans and civilians, restricted use of contaminated lands, clean up of contaminated soil and water, disposal of DU contamination, and military public relations efforts to deny depleted uranium’s effects. In this way, taxpayers can decide if the bang is worth the bucks.
11. In a demonstration of true leadership and vision, the United States of America should lead an international effort to prevent the manufacturing, development, sale, and use of depleted uranium munitions.
Don’t Look, Don’t Find
APPENDIX A – DU USE IN KOSOVO AND SERBIA
During the 1999 war between NATO air forces and Yugoslav ground troops, American A-10 aircraft fired 37,550 rounds of all typed 30mm ammunition. (USAF, 2000). Assuming each A-10 carried a standard combat mix of 5 DU rounds with 1 high explosive incendiary (HEI) round, approximately 31,300 depleted uranium rounds were shot. Each 30mm round contains a depleted uranium penetrator weighing 0.302 kg or 0.66 lb. (Fahey, 1998: 198). Therefore, US forces released approximately 9,453 kg (9.5 metric tons) or 20,658 lb. (10.3 tons) of depleted uranium during the war. Following the end of NATO’s bombing campaign, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) (UNCHS) formed the Balkans Task Force (BTF) to assess the impacts of the war. (UNEP/UNCHS, 1999). Within the Balkans Task Force, an inter-agency ‘Desk Assessment Group’ was assembled to investigate the use of depleted uranium munitions.
The Desk Assessment Group’s investigation was hindered by NATO’s refusal to confirm the quantities and locations of depleted uranium expenditure. (UNEP/UNCHS, 1999:
61). Consequently, the group was reduced to conducting a review of published literature and making assessments based on hypothetical exposure scenarios. The Desk Assessment Group noted that people in the immediate vicinity of a DU attack could be heavily exposed to DU by inhalation. This is confirmed by US Air Force testing showing that “findings of past air sampling efforts revealed contamination was localized to within 300 to 400 feet (90 to 120 m) of the [A-10] target area.” (Nellis, 1998: 3-9).
Claims that the release of depleted uranium in Kosovo resulted in vastly increased rates of radioactivity in the air in Bulgaria or Greece are highly improbable. Following the release of the Balkans Task Force report in October 1999, Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan wrote to NATO requesting details about the use of depleted uranium during Operation Allied Force. Five months later, NATO responded that A-10’s shot depleted uranium during approximately 100 missions. “At this moment it is impossible to state accurately every location where DU ammunition was used,” states Lord George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, in the letter to Kofi Annan. (NATO, 2000).
A NATO map released with the letter to Kofi Annan identifies 28 locations in Kosovo where A-10’s are believed to have released depleted uranium (see page 54).
(NATO,2000). However, it is likely that A-10’s also shot depleted uranium at Yugoslav forces in Serbia, though no locations outside the borders of Kosovo are identified on the NATO map. The Balkans Task Force apparently did not make much of an effort to look for or find depleted uranium, but Christian Science Monitor journalist Scott Peterson found depleted uranium in Djakovica, Kosovo and reported its discovery in Vranje and Bujanovac, Serbia. (Peterson, 1999).
http://www.miltoxproj.org/DU/Report.pdf
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