The ROI-Death (War) Politics or Security; Case In Point.

I am responding not only to this article from a recent post by CIO, but introducing my credible information as a person on the ground whose team worked these RFID issues in the Boeing manufacturing sector from 2001 to 2003. I was the Network Infrastructure Services Chair and Business Manager for this RFID team. This team was one of six or seven different projects that were on-going in which I was 'full-on' and involved, as far as I know. Through no fault of my own, except perhaps my age, I was layed-off with 40-50K people. Additionally, this in turn is another article on port safety.

METRICS:
"One of the challenges that comes along with securing the supply chain is measuring success. How do you know you've prevented something that hasn't happened?" I mentioned in my last post, [Lyle K'ang; No American Management for Our Ports?] about efficiencies. By using traditional business metrics: "Improvements in safety, insurance liability, efficiency.These are outgrowths of a good security program." [Reference 1: Security Compliance, Customs Rattles the Supply Chain.

Well yes, and by the numbers or metrics that are produced that specify 'no hits' or disabling features (dirty bombs exploding) which customs are tracking and looking for. At first glance, it is an easy-no-brainer-approach, of course, this is the obvious way, and a 'best practices' method!

What is a good system is the 'old dash board' system of BI (business intelligence)used in Boeing's manufacturing plants. No problems-the light stay's green and the line keeps on churnin' away. Used in other companies as well, I assume this process will allow freight to move through at lightning speed with the new ATDI. If your cargo is 'trusted' you can go right through via the 'green lane' and not be inspected. This is a great system-you know, getting products there fast. However, are there any foreseeablee features not architected that can breach the 'express lane'? You tell me...

"The reduction in inspections promised by C-TPAT (a government sponsored Web application) are another potential source of ROI. Toymaker Hasbro spent just under $200,000 on its up-front C-TPAT compliance and spends an additional $112,500 a year maintaining it. Since it became C-TPAT-certified in November 2002, its inspections have dropped from 7.6 percent of containers coming into the U.S. in 2001 to 0.66 percent in 2003. Given that in 2003 the company imported about 8,000 containers, and that port authorities charge around $1,000 per inspection, Hasbro is saving about $550,000 a year in inspection costs alone, approximately a 5-to-1 return rate." CIO 2006

"Members of the trade community expect that ATDI participation will be a requirement for Green Lane status. The definition of Advance Trade Data Initiative (ATDI), "which requires importers to share with Customs every bit of information about a shipment, including the purchase order, which ports it passes through, proof of delivery and its final destination within the United States". And while no one has a firm timetable for the merging of ATDI and C-TPAT (Customs says that participating in the ATDI pilot qualifies companies for tier-three status), the funding is in place. In November, Sen. Murray introduced the Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act of 2005; expectations for its passage are high. In all likelihood, CIOs will have between 18 and 36 months to prepare for compliance, but a terror event looms as a wild card. If there's an attack, that timetable could telescope quickly." CIO 2006.

HUGE DATABASES?:
In large companies, databases become very costly and purging data requires a project team to define which, when, who, where, data gets purged. How long it's archived, and for what purpose. IT Architecture is advanced enough today to take in these scenarios. As conservative as we all are, especially in 'money producing the perfect design', it is a 'best-practice' to limit the data archiving processes as an intelligent design.

RFID [Radio Frequency Identification]:
"Smart containers could tell Customs officials (among other things) whether a container had been opened, and, if so, when and where." Reference 2: The Stories Containers Tell-Technology can make the cargo talk.

HIGH SEAS-SATCOM:
I assume the above statement is voicing its concerns about the high-seas and voyages. If it is, the tracking and reusable RFID components have apprecialbly decreased in costs from 3 to 6 years ago. In fact, by using this RFID technology after refinements, budget/costs studies and fairly balancing risks to shippers, ports, destinations, and visual affects of a port explosion in America to its population is imperative. But if not implemented, any company that does not integrate RFID or similar technology to secure our shipments on the ground and ocean, today is dumb. Again, without going into the technical nuances of using Satcom and close reader mechanisms which read RFID tags within buildings, we'll assume that you the reader, has an overview of the technical workings of what it can and can't do.

"Assuring that your suppliers are handling your cargo in a secure way will require greater visibility into what is actually happening in the supply chain". CIO 2006. This is being done today on the ground in battle, in many aspects to record through RFID, smart containers, vehicles and servicing logs and utilizing other promising emerging technologies that are tied into a basic concept of RFID mechanisms.

"For intercontinental shipments, an RFID tag can trigger automated alerts when a container enters a terminal equipped with an RFID network. (Without automated alerts, importers are at the mercy of terminal operators who sometimes don’t send their manual alerts until days after a container arrives in the United States.)"

BOEING:
The above scenario can be done today as witnessed again with Boeing's directives. To further lend credence to my team's research, is Stanford's Professor Hau Lee who found that "between reductions in inventory and pilfering, as well as other savings, companies that use technologies like RFID can avoid as much as $462 in costs per container. Reusable RFID tags range between $20 and $150, and networks can cost from $30,000 for a small site to over $1 million."

NOT A CORRECT STATEMENT:
[["But right now, many of these technologies are still too immature or expensive to work in the real world. Until then, companies will need to integrate systems with their overseas suppliers so that they can risk-manage the supply chain by spotting anomalous activity as it happens. Even secure processes "can be compromised," says Ken Konigsmark, Boeing's C-TPAT program manager. "[Overseas workers] get paid peanuts, and it would be very easy to bribe them."]]

PUT RISK BACK INTO THE MIX?:
The above statement is putting risk back into the mix instead of removing it. Using broad statements without any bases to backup such ridiculous truisms is incredible and meant to confuse the reader about real practices and opportunities that RFID delivers today. Ken inserts about three (expensive, immature, bribery) different topics in his one diatribe.

Let me explain. For instance, Boeing is now working on a technology called 'flight bag' which essentially downloads and uploads information by a system that automatically updates the avionic systems in the cabin, for incoming (docking) aircraft. (It's a get ready for the next trip, type of application). This same system can be extended and used for exports and incoming ships that approach ports since its main fuel is wireless AP's, and/or Satcom used as a backup or redundancy or as an alternative. Electronics or transducers which can be made to record weights of vessels or anything WE want to record, takes innovative thought.

POOR PEOPLE:
Saying 'poor' people (the enemy) can 'hack away' into secure systems designed by security scientists doesn't say much about educated Americans, or 'no nothing' well paid executives. VP's who have nothing to add but company politics should be replaced with bright, energetic, innovative men or women whom are humble and knowing, that make statements supported with ethics. If the systems are breached-they are breached by under-paid internal American security folks. How naive-replace him-he's 'poor' in thought.

Now perhaps, I have introduced a similar atmosphere in which the Coast Guard finds itself in today or probably more aligned to how Boeing can race-to-get its product to market. But 'big' ships are hard to turn in water, no matter who you are, Big C or Big B.

So, what do you say? The CIO article as it stands, is a fantastic, gigantic hoorah, for what we can do as 'a movin' team' when we're pushed to the wall. Don't feel pushed yet? Please don't wait for our 21+ ports to be managed by others besides our American companies and our U.S. Unions. Lazy or Innovative. Intelligent or Ignorant. Tired or Energetic. Or are the ports political? Never mind that-nevertheless, they are not secure! You tell me!!